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Abstract: 
Based on an analytical narrative, and utilizing macroeconomic and new institutional economic 
theory, this exposition studies the Bulgarian economy during the decades after 1989. The three 
decades are placed in the context of the century-and-a-half-long Bulgarian development and 
convergence dynamic. They are then presented in terms of clearly defined sub-periods, and each 
sub-period is analyzed in detail. The analysis for each period focuses on three sets of issues: 
macroeconomic developments, microeconomic developments, and institutional changes. The 
exposition ends by applying the insights from the analysis to the question of whether the state of the 
economy in Bulgaria as of 2019 gives grounds for pessimism (Bulgaria will continue the cycles of 
unsuccessful convergence) or for optimism (Bulgaria will achieve an unprecedented degree of 
convergence in the coming decades). The answer is that at present both expectations can be 
supported by sets of serious arguments. 






The overview of the Bulgarian economy during the three decades spanning the turn of the 
millennium presented in this exposition has two main goals. The first is to put, from a 
macroeconomic perspective, these three decades into the context of the already-existing longer 
mapping of the overarching macroeconomic processes characterizing the country over the last 
century and a half. The second is to get a footing on this broader context and attempt to analyze 
features and specifics of the most recent three decades to see if there are any qualitatively different 
aspects to them in comparison to the preceding period of more than a century. 
The method applied to achieve these two goals will be analytical narrative1 grounded in 
macroeconomics and new institutional economics. With the insights from these two large areas of 
economic theorizing in mind, the main facts of the Bulgarian economic developments in the decades 
surrounding the turn of the century will be analyzed, put in the perspective of the longer-run 
economic development of the country, and used as a basis for reaching inferences about the 
periodicity, main characteristics, and modes of unfolding of economic processes over the last three 
decades. 
The facts used to ground the analytical narrative are mostly macroeconomic. While 
macroeconomic data are not exempt from methodological and empirical problems, they are 
sufficient in terms of quality and relevance for the purposes of the exposition herein. There is also a 
set of microeconomic as well as political facts from the three decades covered by the overview. The 
latter two types of facts will be mostly used to supplement, illustrate, and provide analytical density 
to the narrative.  
                                                            
1 For a theoretical exposition and empirical application of this method see Bates et.al. 1998. For an 
application to the Bulgarian case see V. Ganev 2007. 
Bulgaria’s macroeconomic performance in the long run2 
The relevance of the long run for understanding Bulgaria’s economy 
The context of a relatively less developed country trying to catch up to the developed 
European leaders is an aspect of the Bulgarian economy which has generated sustained interest in 
the international economics research community throughout its existence as an independent 
country. Examples of such research interests include Gerschenkron (1962), Lampe (1986), and 
Palairet (1997). In all these cases Bulgaria has been viewed from two perspectives: its long-run arc of 
catching up, or of failing to do so, to the developed European models as well as the comparison of its 
arc to the ones of other European economies following similar catching-up trajectories. On the part 
of Bulgarian researchers, the first of these perspectives has most consistently been pursued by 
Avramov (2001 for the 20th century as a whole, 2007 for the pre-1945 period), with specific aspects 
of the economy also discussed in Daskalov (2005) and Ivanov (2012). 
No research from this perspective has been conducted for the Bulgarian economy for the first 
two decades of the 21st century. All available overall development-encompassing studies have been 
relatively narrower in focus. Hristova et. al. (2004) focus on the first 10-15 years of transition with 
very limited mention of the pre-1989 development. Yotzov et. al. (2017) and Ganev (2017) 
concentrate on the decade after Bulgaria’s EU membership, and have a focus on developmental (and 
catching-up) issues, but they extend no further back than 1999. Finally, Ganev (2018) extends a 
number of indicators into a relatively consistent series back to the 1960s, but lacks the comparison 
with the developmental models to which the country has been trying to catch up. The purpose of the 
remaining exposition is to fill at least to some extent this gap in the analysis of the Bulgarian longer-
run macroeconomic dynamic from a developmental point of view. 
                                                            
2 The exposition in this section owes a significant debt to Avramov (2001, 2007, 2008). 
A long story in a single graph 
The purpose of this first part of the overview of Bulgaria’s economy is to put the most recent 
three decades of its development, spanning the turn of the millennium, in the longer-run perspective 
of the last century and a half. The simplest, yet analytically rich way to embark on this path is with a 
single image in the form of a graph, presented as Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Bulgaria: real income per capita as percentage of West Europe 5* 1870-2019. 
 

















































































































Before discussing the significance of the image in Figure 1, its use as a starting point needs to 
be justified. The five countries, against which the performance of the Bulgarian economy is 
juxtaposed, are selected based on three criteria. First, the countries need to represent, to a sufficient 
degree, the highest level of economic development throughout the period for which a comparison is 
made. Second, the countries need to be large enough to exhibit a relatively stable dynamic and be 
less likely to be subject to idiosyncratic upward or downward spurts. Third, they are chosen from 
Europe, since throughout the period covered by the discussion here it is Europe which is the relevant 
achievement horizon for Bulgaria. Thus the idea is to show Bulgaria’s relative, not absolute, 
performance compared to a representative sample of the highest European performers throughout 
the period under study. 
The image in Figure 1 is significant, because it is a concentrated representation the most 
important aspects of Bulgaria’s macroeconomic story: it does not seem to be able to consistently and 
sustainably catch up with the standard of living in Western Europe. 
There is a lot to be said about this simple finding. The first relates to the its most likely 
proximate cause. In the long run economic wellbeing is determined by the ability of people in society 
to satisfy human wants with the available, scarce, resources. This ability is a direct function of the 
                                                            
3 The 2018 version of the database, downloaded from 
https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/maddison/data/mpd2018.xlsx  
4 The April 2019 version of the database, downloaded from https://www.conference-
board.org/data/economydatabase/TED1  
amount of capital goods in all their forms available to human labor to transform resources into 
satisfied wants by using some technological production process. Thus the accumulation of capital5 
determines the standard of living of a society in the long run. So, Figure 1 actually reveals a chronic 
failure of Bulgarian society to accumulate capital of sufficient quantity (amount of capital goods per 
worker) and quality (capital goods, in all their forms, embodying the global edge of technological 
knowledge). For a small open economy like Bulgaria this failure has two faces: a failure to 
domestically generate savings to finance capital formation, and a failure to attract capital from 
abroad. 
A second message from Figure 1 is that the chronic inability of Bulgarian society to catch up 
with the rich countries in Western Europe goes through cycles. Periods of visible falling behind are 
followed by seemingly promising periods of catching up, yet the catching up almost never reaches 
above 60%. It seems that something is always lacking for Bulgaria to make a crucial step through its 
ceiling. It is as if something is always missing. The word “without” seems to emerge systematically in 
the available academic pictures of the Bulgarian economy. The subtitle of Michael Palairet’s (1997) 
insightful economic history of the Balkans in the long 19th century, including Bulgaria, is “Evolution 
without development”. The title of the second part of the first volume of Avramov’s (2007) 
monumental history of Bulgaria’s first capitalism is “Capitalism without capital”. The very title of 
Ivanov’s (2008) history of economic endeavors during the communist period is “Reformism without 
                                                            
5 To keep the clarity of the argument, here technological knowledge is considered as a part of 
society’s capital stock, in terms of being both a part of human capital (technological knowledge and 
skills of specific economic agents) and of social capital (the overall level of technological knowledge 
achieved by a society). Technology, as the term is understood here, encompasses not only modes of 
physical transformation of raw resources into satisfied human wants, but also organizational, 
institutional, and contractual aspects of production. Technological innovation and improvement 
happen in all these spheres. Here they are included in the term “capital accumulation”. 
reforms”. It seems that the Bulgarian long economic story is that the missing ingredients necessary 
for a sustainable catching up to the rich West define the dynamic of economic processes in the 
country as a sequence of efforts to catch up, bouncing off the ceiling, and falling behind, followed by 
another effort. Avramov (2007) has captured this regularity aptly in the already-mentioned second 
part of the first volume by using the Sisyphus metaphor for describing both the internal and external 
aspects Bulgaria’s economic dynamic. 
A third message hidden behind Figure 1 is that for a century and a half Bulgarian society has 
actually achieved an absolute increase in living standards.6 The figure shows the ratio of real incomes 
in Bulgaria relative to the five rich countries in Western Europe, and inasmuch as they have become 
significantly richer over this time period, so has Bulgaria. So Bulgarians have been able to form some 
capital and internalize some of the global economic achievements, even though only up to a point. 
With time, developing technologies, production practices, and new products from the most highly 
developed and rich parts of the world do manage to enter Bulgaria, together with some capital and 
entrepreneurial transfers, which consequently raises the absolute standard of living in the country. 
This seems to be a regular finding for other peripheral countries like Bulgaria as well. 
Some other important aspects of the long Bulgarian development, which are not directly 
reflected in Figure 1, also deserve a specific mention to build a deeper understanding of its context. 
Bulgaria is geographically situated in Southeastern Europe and throughout the last century and a half 
it has been its specific relations with the rest of the continent, especially with its most developed and 
richest part, which have defined its economic dynamic. Even during periods when Bulgaria was 
following a developing strategy opposing the adoption of the economically successful models in the 
rich Western European countries, it has been their growth which pushed the economic possibilities 
frontier to be chased. 
                                                            
6 The more direct evidence for this increase can be found in Ivanov (2012) and Ganev (2018). 
Closely related to the above observation is another one: similarly to several other Eastern 
European countries within the last century and a half Bulgaria has radically changed its development 
model twice. After a sort of capitalism between achieving political independence in 1878 and 1945,7 
Bulgaria became one of the strictest and most orthodox planned economies in the communist bloc, 
which consistently refused to permit even the smallest traces of markets and individual 
entrepreneurship. Then, when this radically different model, opposing the very core of Western 
economic development, failed, Bulgaria joined the other countries from the communist bloc in a new 
attempt to integrate into the capitalist world. Thus between the end of World War II and the 
beginning of the 21st century the Bulgarian economy underwent two transitions – one from a sort of 
capitalism towards a communist planned and command economy, and then back to a type of 
capitalism with private property in the means of production and markets as the major coordinating 
mechanism. It is precisely this second episode which is has been known as “the” transition since 
1989. 
Two constants in Bulgaria’s long developmental fluctuations 
Regardless of the specific and unique features of each period of the long Bulgarian economic 
development, so far the last century and a half can be characterized by two constants. The first is the 
already mentioned lack of capital and inability to generate it domestically in sufficient amounts, 
resulting in the economic dynamic of the country always being dependent of flows from abroad. The 
second is the fact that the various models of economic development over the period, regardless of 
how radically different they may have been, were also imported from abroad and transplanted into 
the Bulgarian context. 
                                                            
7 On the half-heartedness of this attempt at introducing capitalism see the ample evidence in 
Avramov 2007. 
The combination of these two constants in the long Bulgarian economic dynamic has two 
consequences. The first is well-known and discussed and relates to the insight, most famously 
championed by the new institutional economics school of thought, that the deep local context is a 
major determinant of the effects of any transplanted model or institutional framework. The second 
consequence, however, has been routinely overlooked, even though its implications may be at least 
as momentous. The importation of foreign development models, whether capitalistic markets or 
communistic plans, coupled with lack of sufficient domestic savings and capital generation inevitably 
means an extremely elevated role of the state in the development process in Bulgaria. The state has 
been the main agent, propagator, and arbiter in the development process. The flip side of this state 
of affairs is the weakness of any existing or potential authentic local individual engines and agents of 
significant capital accumulation and technology transfer. For the capitalistic episodes in Bulgaria’s 
economic history this means that there have never been conditions for the emergence, growth, and 
strengthening of a sufficiently large and sustained group of Bulgarian market entrepreneurs who 
have provided the main leverage for the unprecedented growth in productivity and in the living 
standards in the West. 
Therefore, a market economy without entrepreneurs can be adequately added to the other 
“withouts” listed above, with which Bulgarian has been facing its long-run development endeavor. It 
must be stressed that the observation here is not that there have been literally no genuine 
entrepreneurs in Bulgaria’s past or present. It is rather that, first, there have never been a large 
enough number of authentic market-based and market-using agents of capital formation and 
accumulation and technological improvement. And, second, that there have always been a significant 
number of power-based and government-hierarchy-using agents of predation. This second type of 
predatory entrepreneurs exhibits, at least in the case of Bulgaria, a strong proclivity to gravitate 
around government power and its hierarchy and to use it for enrichment, which, however, in the 
long run adds nothing to the productive capacity of the economy as a whole. 
It is in this general long-run context that the most recent transition period in Bulgarian 
economic history has been unfolding. Continuing with the seemingly simple but highly informative 
look at Figure 1, the last three decades conform to all the basic long-run features of the Bulgarian 
economic development outlined above, and yet also exhibit some specific and unique features. The 
post-1989 period has seen relative levels of real income per capita in Bulgaria ranging between one 
quarter and one half of the comparator five rich West European countries. The data also show the 
continued presence of cyclicality with a period of relative decline, a bottoming-out, and a period of 
relative catching up. While it is true that in the early 1990s the underlying processes behind the data 
involve dramatic transformations in crucial spheres such as the economic system, politics, and the 
institutional framework, it is also true that there have been similar periods in the past. Three such 
periods are the decade after political independence in 1878, the decade after World War II, and, with 
some qualifications, the interwar period. 
Given the clearly visible similarities of the post-1989 dynamic of Bulgaria’s real income per 
capita relative to the rich West European countries with previous historical episodes, however, 
Figure 1 exhibits two historically unique features of the period. First, the ratio of Bulgarian real 
incomes at one quarter of the incomes in comparator rich countries reached in the late 1990s is a 
historical minimum. Second, the speed of catching up during the two decades following this 
minimum is a historical maximum and, as of 2019, is still ongoing. 
This means that the general look at the long picture of Bulgaria’s economic development 
allows for a range of possible interpretations of the most recent three decades in terms of outlining 
possible predictions for the future. The two extremes in this range are the pessimistic and the 
optimistic one. The most prominent exponent of the pessimistic interpretation is Avramov (2001, 
2007). His main point is that all periods of relative catching up involve foreign conditionality imposed 
on Bulgaria from outside and it is precisely this conditionality which disciplines the Bulgarian society 
into taking into account the longer-run perspective, including institutional reforms and capital 
accumulation. And consequently whenever this foreign conditionality is relaxed, often due to its own 
success, gradually institutions, policies, and performance begin to deteriorate until a new moment of 
crisis is reached creating the necessary environment enabling the imposition of a new set of foreign 
developmental conditions. 
The optimistic interpretation will be developed in more detail below. The gist of it is that the 
first two decades of the 21st century constitute an unprecedented set of developments which hold a 
promise of enabling the Bulgarian economy to break from the cycle of failure and to converge more 
substantively towards the standard of living of richer countries. The technical arguments in favor of 
this more optimistic view are both macroeconomic, involving the possibility that the domestic 
capacity to generate savings and form capital may have discernibly increased, and institutional, 
involving an international position of the country making the foreign conditionality more constantly 
and consistently applied. 
Naturally, at present both the pessimistic and the optimistic scenarios remain possible. The 
task of the next section of the exposition, focusing more deeply on the last three decades, will be to 
provide a more elaborate understanding of the factors which to a large extent may determine 
whether the Bulgarian economy will continue with its cycles of convergence and falling behind, or 
will embark on a more promising convergence path. 
The 1989–2019 period in Bulgaria’s economy  
To enter the analysis of the last three decades of Bulgarian economic development in an 
orderly manner, it seems useful to introduce some sub-periodization in this relatively long 
timeframe. Macroeconomically, from the perspective of real growth per capita also clearly visible in 
Figure 1, thee periods of approximately equal (as of 2019) length clearly stand out. 
The first about 10 years are a period of absolute and relative macroeconomic decline. This is 
the decade which brought Bulgaria to its historical bottom in terms of the ratio of its real per capita 
income to the real per capita income in the rich European countries. The second decade, framed by a 
complex nexus of events and processes at the very end of the 20th century (see below) and the global 
economic crisis known as the Great Recession of 2007–2009, is one of fast absolute and relative 
growth. In absolute terms, the decadal rate of growth of real per capita income during this decade is 
the second fastest since 1887,8 while in relative terms the decadal rate of convergence towards the 
rich European countries is the fastest (Figure 1). The third decade, at the end of which the present 
exposition takes place, is marked by a continuation of absolute and relative growth but at 
significantly reduced speed compared to the previous decade. Both the fact that growth continues, 
and the fact that it is slower have importance in the analysis below. What follows in this section of 
the exposition is an in-depth analytical look at each of these three approximately decade-long sub-
periods. 
Bulgaria’s first post-1989 economic decade: decline, decapitalization, and crisis 
The first decade after 1989 in Bulgaria is characterized by an ongoing crisis. It does have a 
macroeconomic dimension in terms of real income per capita, which dropped by more than 25% 
between 1988 and 1997, of unemployment which shot up from non-existent to between 15 and 20%, 
and of inflation which was never below 25% on a 12-month basis and reached hyperinflationary 
levels in the spring of 1991 and the winter of 1996/7.9 As imperfect as the data for this period are, 
                                                            
8 The first is the decade spanning the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, or the second, third, and fourth 
five-year plans of Bulgaria’s communist economy. The data are from the Total Economy Database, 
see Footnote 4. 
9 All data are from the National Statistical Institute, latest available revisions for the respective years. 
It needs to be mentioned that most standard indicators of the economy, including GDP, the 
they also indicate a true meltdown in the process of capital formation in the Bulgarian economy. The 
available measurements10 indicate that gross fixed capital formation cumulatively plummeted by 
more than two thirds. In fact, the Bulgarian economy was severely decapitalized throughout this 
decade and was in effect constantly losing whatever little competitive productive capacity it had left 
after the communist period. 
The crisis of the first decade after 1989 also has an internal and external microeconomic 
dimension. Internally, this was the dissolution of the communist plan, the breaking up of chains of 
production and trade channels, the unclear prospects facing the state-owned enterprises with 
respect to their status in the new situation, and the very slow emergence of private economic 
entrepreneurs. Externally, this was the breaking up of the communist system of international trade, 
coordination, and division of labor, leaving in a very short span of time many Bulgarian industrial 
branches such as textiles, food processing, pharmaceuticals and cosmetics, tractors and electric 
trucks without viable external markets. 
This first decade of the last 30 years also has an institutional dimension, related to the change 
in the property rights framework of the economy and to the establishment of an institutional 
framework based on private property and market interaction. At the highest constitutional level the 
transition was initiated with the 1991 Constitution,11 which introduced private property in the means 
of production, and provided guarantees for private entrepreneurial activity, contracting, and 
production. However, in fact, the Bulgarian economy was very slow to privatize, with the state-
                                                            
unemployment rate (ILO methodology), and the consumer price index only started to be measured in 
Bulgaria in the early 1990s. 
10 They are included in various editions of the annual NSI publication Main Macroeconomic 
Indicators. 
11 See Hristova et.al. 2004:28-47. 
owned sector dominating throughout this first decade. Attempts at privatization were half-hearted 
and large-scale privatization did not happen during this sub-period. The establishment of some 
essential institutions of capitalism such as the capital market, a functioning and predictable 
framework for contract enforcement and bankruptcy, various market regulations as well as 
regulation of public procurement never reached a significant degree during these first years.12 
All these macroeconomic, microeconomic, and institutional problems during Bulgaria’s early 
transition define the decade as particularly negative, but it would be factually erroneous to claim 
that the problems started with it. In addition to Figure 1, Ganev (2018) demonstrates that for both 
absolute and relative real income per capita, for the level of employment, and for at least one 
important social indicator, longevity, the year 1989 does not constitute a significant break in the 
dynamic of the time series. The crisis processes had started much earlier – in the case of the 
economy at least in the mid-1980s, in the case of demographic processes as early as the late 1960s. 
Another clearly problematic legacy from the preceding terminal crisis of the Bulgarian planned 
communist economy is the very high public debt, mostly to private Western creditors. In early 1990 
the Bulgarian government unilaterally refused to continue servicing this debt, which led to the 
exclusion of Bulgaria and Bulgarians from the international capital markets and effectively blocked a 
major channel for capital inflows. 
Bulgaria also adopted extremely loose monetary and fiscal policies throughout the period. 
Budget deficits were rampant, and when coupled with implicit budgetary guarantees and subsidies 
the official and quasi-fiscal deficits were clearly unsustainable in the long run (Avramov and Sgard 
1996). The central bank, institutionalized as the pillar of a two-tier banking system only in 1991, 
proved both highly ineffective in supervising the banks, most of which were still state-owned, and 
highly prepared to uncritically refinance them by issuing monetary base whenever they exhibited any 
                                                            
12 Ibid., 48-67. 
problems. Finally, the external situation of the country was also not favorable in this period, mostly 
due to the post-Yugoslav conflict and the accompanying sanctions which seriously impeded trade 
flows and also provided favorable conditions for criminal embargo-breaking activities. 
Under these circumstances a very important development took place. Circumspectly and 
insightfully described in V. Ganev (2007), the phenomenon of large-scale predatory entrepreneurship 
flourished in the early 1990s in Bulgaria. Predation was mostly concentrated on the body of the state 
and aimed towards state assets, since the economic resources of the country were dominantly 
owned by the state. The state was deliberately weakened and a variety of projects aiming at 
enrichment from and through the state unfolded. They actively used both sets of soft budget 
constraints – in the budget, always ready to cover the losses of state-owned enterprises, and in the 
monetary system where the central bank always proved ready to cover losses from bad credit. The 
first ten years of post-communist economic transition in Bulgaria were the kingdom of predatory 
entrepreneurship, when this type of strategy was both successful and capable of severely impeding 
its competitor – the productive, value-adding entrepreneurs who naturally found the situation in 
Bulgaria at that time quite adverse and unattractive. 
All facts presented above allow for an outline of the model followed by Bulgaria in this decade: 
absence of privatization, lack of substantive structural reforms, superficial institutionalization of the 
financial system, extremely loose fiscal and monetary policies, very low levels of trade with the 
world, and blocked access of foreign capital to the country. The flip side of the same model was an 
extremely heavy involvement of the state, very often as a monopolist, in entrepreneurial and 
managerial activities, soft budget constraints and severe deficiencies in enforcing private property 
rights.13 All of this ensured extremely favorable conditions for private (but politically well-connected) 
                                                            
13 For an insightful description of the main facets of this model by a contemporary, see Avramov 
1994. 
predatory projects and an extremely adverse environment for Bulgarian and foreign productive and 
value-adding entrepreneurs and capital. It is very difficult to formulate with any level of precision 
exactly what model of economic development aimed at long-run improvement of the standard of 
living of people the Bulgarian ruling elite was trying to implement in this period, but it definitely had 
nothing to do with capital accumulation, productive entrepreneurship, and markets. 
Perhaps not surprisingly this mode of existence of the Bulgarian economy proved 
unsustainable and starting in 1996 several changes took place, opening up the doors for the second 
sub-period of the last three decades. Chronologically, the list includes a push in privatization, mainly 
under the pressure and conditions of foreign institutional creditors of Bulgaria such as the IMF and 
the World Bank. This privatization took three main forms: mass voucher privatization, cash 
privatization, and worker-manager buyouts.14 Regardless of serious questions about the efficiency of 
this process, within several years the Bulgarian economy was de facto privatized and the share of the 
private sector in gross value added and in employment reached levels compatible with normally 
functioning market economies. Another change was the introduction of a specific monetary regime, 
the Bulgarian currency board arrangement, which anchored monetary base emissions to the 
Deutsche mark (later the Euro) at a fixed exchange rate,15 removed most discretionary powers from 
the hands of the central bank, and enhanced the supervision of commercial banks. Last but not least, 
Bulgaria embarked in a credible way on a path of accession to the European Union and NATO, clearly 
signaling that the country has made a decision in its civilizational orientation. 
Bulgaria’s second post-1989 economic decade: accession 
                                                            
14 On the broad variety of forms of privatization in Bulgaria see Hristova et.al. 2004:121-40. 
15 Under such a regime, the central bank is not allowed to hold domestic government debt and to 
lend to domestic banks, and can issue new base money (cash or bank reserves) only when receiving 
the anchor currency at the legally specified exchange rate. 
It is precisely the accession and integration effort, especially with respect to the EU, which 
defines the second decade of the post-1989 development in Bulgaria. Achieving membership criteria, 
especially in the economic sphere, was the major factor anchoring efforts, policies, decisions, and 
activities. Macroeconomically, this was an unqualified success, both in light of the very long path of 
Bulgaria’s economic development and especially in comparison with the preceding decade. The 
requirements for and expectations about successful accession anchored economic decisions and had 
a profound real effect. Real per capita income nearly doubled; the unemployment rate fell from the 
high double digits down to about 5%; inflation decreased to low levels with occasional relatively 
small bursts related to international prices of fuels and foodstuffs. 
Some other macroeconomic facts from this period also deserve a special mention. First, 
monetary stabilization, significant advances in privatization, and the clear prospects for joining the 
EU and NATO coupled with opening up of the country for international capital flows16 meant that it 
experienced a very large inflow of foreign, mostly Western, capital and that most of this inflow 
financed productive capital formation in the country. Thus, foreign savings were added to domestic 
savings as a source of gross fixed capital formation and the ratio of investment to overall economic 
activity reached historically record levels towards the end of this second post-1989 decade. Real 
gross fixed capital formation increased by a factor of close to 4. A closely related development was 
observed in the size and profile of Bulgaria’s foreign trade. During the decade in question, Bulgaria’s 
foreign trade turnover increased fivefold, and the geographical structure of the country’s 
                                                            
16 An important role in this opening up is played by the resumption of servicing of the renegotiated 
Bulgarian foreign debt and by the implementation of EU membership requirements together with a 
series of agreements of Bulgaria with the IMF, all of which impose as a prerequisite opening up to 
international capital flows. 
international trade shifted decidedly towards the EU,17 while its goods structure included an increase 
in higher value-added components in the exports and a very sharp rise in the share of investment 
goods in the imports.18 
In terms of macroeconomic policies, the second decade after 1989 in Bulgaria is the exact 
opposite to the first. The budget was generally balanced with small deficits or surpluses. It has to be 
remarked that this fiscal stability was achieved while maintaining a policy strategy of significant 
decreases in direct tax rates with the goal of making the country more attractive for business and 
investment and making Bulgarian producers more cost-competitive. Monetary conditions were 
subject to the effective implementation of the currency board regime and were characterized by 
predictability and financial discipline.19 An important aspect of macroeconomic stability was political: 
after going through three parliaments and eight governments (with an average mandate of 11 
months) in 1990–1997, between May 1997 and July 2009 Bulgaria experienced three consecutive full 
parliamentary and governmental mandates. All three governments had a clear anchoring agenda: EU 
accession. 
EU accession defined the institutional changes in Bulgaria after the beginning of accession 
negotiations in late 1999. Chapter after negotiating chapter, institutions in Bulgaria were reformed, 
regulations introduced or modified, and the conditions deemed necessary for membership were 
introduced into the Bulgarian economy. Another source of foreign conditionality in this decade were 
                                                            
17 From a bit above 40% to more than 60% for both exports and imports. Data from Bulgarian 
national bank. 
18 Same source. 
19 On the remarkable turnaround in the Bulgarian monetary environment with the introduction of 
the currency board see Hristova et.al. 2004:99-120 and Ganev and Wyzan 2005. 
the international financial institutions, at whose insistence and with whose assistance reforms in 
important spheres such as healthcare and the pension system were introduced. 
At the microeconomic level, the financial system was completely overhauled as part of the 
change in the monetary regime, and commercial banks were privatized to foreign investors and 
gradually began to channel domestic and foreign savings into the Bulgarian economy. Almost 
nonexistent at the end of the 20th century, banking credit experienced a boom in the first decade of 
the 21st, and became so robust that the Bulgarian national bank resorted to one of its few available 
instruments (the reserve requirement) to try to moderate it. Related to the combination of 
privatization, the bank financing boom, and influx of foreign direct investment (accompanied by a 
surge in imports of investment goods) were significant surges in the construction and manufacturing 
industry. An important aspect of the development of the microeconomic environment in this period 
was the visible improvement of the conditions favoring productive entrepreneurship. The currency 
board, the balanced budgets and many institutional and regulatory reforms significantly decreased 
the resources available for predation both from and through the state, thus rendering the returns for 
predatory strategies less attractive than in the previous decade.20 Simultaneously, improved 
institutionalization of market niches, the increase in the role of privately owned enterprises, and the 
valuable experience related to the inflow of foreign businesses with their entrepreneurial and 
managerial traditions constituted a significant uplift in the outlook for productive entrepreneurship. 
The facts about the second economic decade of Bulgaria after 1989 discussed up to here allow 
to infer a definite image of the developmental model followed during this period. It is a model based 
on the re-instituting of the economy as a privately-owned, capital-oriented, and market driven one 
and on activating the two most important factors of production – capital through vastly increased 
                                                            
20 This is not to say that predatory entrepreneurship disappeared in Bulgaria. It just registered a 
relative retreat in this period. 
real investment, and labor through significantly raised levels of employment. An important plank in 
the model was the selling point of Bulgaria as a low-cost, including low-tax, place of production, 
which is however integrating and well-connected to one of the most lucrative markets in the world. 
The crucially important for the success of this model expectations of economic agents were 
successfully anchored by the EU accession process. All aspects of this model converged sufficiently 
well to make this decade one of the most economically successful in Bulgarian history, and the most 
successful in terms of the speed of catching up to the rich West. Yet there are some features in this 
model which make it inherently unsustainable in the long run. If successful, the low-cost strategy 
tends to inevitably undermine itself – as a country gets richer its production environment necessarily 
becomes more and more high-cost. Also, the major driver of positive developments in this decade is 
the expectation for accession. But expectations are never a long-run constant, and, especially if they 
are as bright as they were in Bulgaria with respect to EU membership, have a tendency to get 
disappointed at some point. 
Bulgaria’s third post-1989 economic decade: post-accession and post-recession 
The end of the accession decade of Bulgaria was framed by two accidentally simultaneous 
events: the start of actual EU membership in 2007 and the global Great Recession, which arrived in 
Bulgaria in late 2008. Since 2009 Bulgaria has been, economically, in its post-accession and post-
recession decade. The Bulgarian record during this latest period, which is still going on, has been 
decidedly more mixed and nuanced than either of the previous two decades.21 
The Bulgarian economy underwent a recession in 2009 the depth of which was comparable to 
recessions around the world during this episode. When growth returned, it was far from spectacular, 
yet still sufficient for the country to resume its catching up, albeit at a pace much slower than during 
the previous decade. In all, real income per capita in absolute terms increased by about one third 
                                                            
21 This decade in Bulgarian economic development is covered in greater detail in G. Ganev 2017. 
during this latest decade, while in terms relative to the five rich Western European countries it 
increased by about ten percentage points. Unemployment increased by about eight percentage 
points and stayed at the high level until 2014, but then fell significantly and as of early 2019 has 
reached historically low levels. In parallel, employment fell and stayed relatively low until 2014, but 
then began to rise and as of 2019 is at historically high levels. Inflation has been very low throughout 
the decade, including a three-year period of consumer price deflation in 2013–2016.22 
The dynamic of gross fixed capital formation, so critical to the analytical viewpoint adopted in 
this exposition, is somewhat negative, but to an extent which indicates a slowdown rather than a 
decline in the process of capitalization of the Bulgarian economy.23 Over the decade membership in 
the EU has proven to be of great significance for Bulgaria’s capitalization due to the fact that EU 
transfers have enabled the financing of a large part of capital investment in various types of 
infrastructure by the state. At the same time private capital inflows into Bulgaria have been much 
slower after 2009 than during the preceding decade. 
In terms of foreign trade, the most recent decade has been similar to the previous one, 
exhibiting a significant increase in total turnover and shifts of the structure of exports towards 
industrial products and investment goods. A telling difference from the previous decade in this 
                                                            
22 While deflation is generally not considered a symptom of a healthy economy, the particular 
episode in Bulgaria indicates that the downward movement of consumer prices was not due to 
internal problems, since the deflationary episode coincided with a tripling of the economy’s growth 
rate. 
23 In real terms, capital formation according to the latest available data is at 75% of its peak levels in 
2008. Yet even at these lower levels, and maintaining a ratio of about 20% of GDP, it is sufficient to 
not only replace depreciated capital goods, but to expand the economy’s productive capacity, even 
though at a slower pace than in the previous decade. 
respect is the fact that exports have been growing significantly faster than imports, with most of the 
increase due to rising exports to the other countries in the European Union. 
The economic policies of the government also continued to be generally sound over the most 
recent decade, with consistent implementation of the currency board regime and a relatively stable 
fiscal stance. There were, however, two episodes during which the budgetary discipline was 
compromised – during the recession and in the wake of the KTB failure (see below), the government 
allowed sharp increases in the budget deficit, accompanied in the second episode by an increase in 
public debt. However, in both cases balance was restored relatively quickly. But while the 
macroeconomic policy mix has remained sound and stable, the reform efforts of the government 
have dwindled. After the pre-accession decade of intense, numerous, and momentous reforms in 
most spheres of economic life in Bulgaria, the most recent decade has seen no reforms which can be 
qualified as such. As will be postulated later, the lack of reforms in some areas, especially the 
judiciary and the governance of state-owned enterprises, is becoming an important factor in 
determining the future direction of the Bulgarian economy. 
While in terms of processes and policies at the macroeconomic level there has been no 
significant change over the most recent decade compared to the previous one, besides some general 
slowdown, the changes at the microeconomic level have been more significant. At least three 
directions of such changes can be mentioned (G. Ganev 2017:45-6). One is integration of Bulgarian 
businesses in the complex international value-added chains. Such incorporation of Bulgarian 
production in the global economy can be observed at many levels – from mining (e.g. non-ferrous 
metals), through light (apparels) or heavy (electrical machinery) industry, to services (tourism, 
software, call centers). Another microeconomic development is competition, and especially the 
exhibited capacity of Bulgarian businesses to engage in and withstand it. Beside individual cases, 
widespread concerns during the pre-accession period that once Bulgaria actually becomes a member 
of the EU its producers will be severely threatened by the strong competitive pressure coming from 
their more established, more experienced, and more productive counterparts from the common 
European market proved ungrounded. On the contrary, the developments in the size, geographical, 
and goods structure of the Bulgarian trade balance mentioned above indicate an increase in the 
competitiveness of Bulgarian producers, who thus seem to have benefited rather than suffered from 
the enhanced competition within the EU. A third microeconomic development over the most recent 
decade has been the deepening of the introduction of demonstrably successful business practices 
and models – industrial zones, air travel, logistics, tourism (especially accommodation), or mass retail 
are a few examples. 
Such practices and models also bring the affirmation of a business ethic rather favoring 
productive and value-adding entrepreneurial strategies over the well-established in Bulgaria 
predatory ones, and it would seem that this change would tip the balance between predatory and 
productive entrepreneurship in Bulgaria even more in favor of the latter than it was during the 
accession decade. However, the reality seems to have been more complex. While developments 
favoring productive entrepreneurship have continued, changes favoring predation have also 
happened. Besides all their other effects, continued rising real incomes of people, monetary stability, 
and budget discipline have with the years significantly increased the total wealth base on which non-
productive entrepreneurs can prey, increasing once again the expected returns to such business 
strategies. The most common mode of predation has changed considerably compared to the 1990s. 
While the first decade after 1989 was characterized by preying on the state in its quality as the single 
dominant wealth-holder in the country, the third decade after 1989 sees preying through the state 
by using it to secure rents. Thus, predatory entrepreneurship in Bulgaria has taken the more 
traditional form of rent-seeking through state-capture. The state is used to create privileged access 
of well-connected predatory entrepreneurs (known as “oligarchs”) to economic opportunities by 
limiting the access of their competitors. This is happening in spheres such as public procurement, 
regulation of specific business and market niches, and, last but not least, disbursement of EU funds. 
Possibly the largest-scale and best-known case of this state-capture based predatory project 
during this decade was the case of KTB.24 Emerging as a small bank in the beginning of the century, it 
expanded to become the fourth largest bank in the country, connected with a broad array of 
businesses, with a media empire, and with political parties. For various reasons, eventually the 
project fell apart and the bank collapsed, causing the largest bank failure in Bulgarian history, 
exposing a capital deficiency to the tune of 5% of GDP, and causing serious pressure to the rest of the 
Bulgarian banking system in the second half of 2014. A necessary condition for the unfolding of this 
and other predatory projects is the complicity, if not the outright assistance, of the state. There must 
be high-level politicians whose political and economic calculus comes out in favor of allowing, or 
actively sponsoring, such projects. 
This means that the issue of the success of predatory projects in Bulgaria over the most recent 
decades is related to the question of why Bulgaria’s ruling politicians face the incentives they face. 
Two important aspects of their incentives are the sanctioning of their decisions and actions in the 
context of foreign conditionality (can they be punished by the EU?) and in the context of domestic 
law enforcement (can they be punished by the Bulgarian judicial system?). The answer to both 
questions at present is a conditional “no”. While the EU does have the instruments to sanction and 
condition when macroeconomic policies are out of line and may threaten economic stability in the 
Union as a whole, its ability to punish political behavior causing mostly domestic problems in the 
member state is, up to now, limited. At the same time, the problems of the Bulgarian judicial system, 
especially in dealing with cases of high corruption and abuse of power, can be aptly demonstrated by 
the fact that in Bulgaria there have been no high corruption, conflict of interest, or abuse of power 
indictments or convictions. This problem is reaching a point where the major deficiency of the 
                                                            
24 A highly detailed exposition of the unfolding of this case can be found in Markova 2017. The 
intricate way in which the whole system of state bodies designed to prevent precisely such cases of 
predation was compromised is analyzed in Transparency International Bulgaria 2017. 
Bulgarian judicial system – the lack of accountability of the Prosecutor General – is mentioned 
explicitly in a report analyzing Bulgaria’s macroeconomic imbalances.25 Ultimately, the state of the 
Bulgarian judiciary points to yet another “without”, which characterizes the environment in which 
Bulgaria’s development has had to happen: without a rule of law. 
Having outlined the incentives facing Bulgarian politicians and favoring the effectiveness of 
predatory strategies in Bulgaria, it must be noted that there is pressure for change both internally 
and externally, in both cases coming from the EU. Domestically, the push towards changes in the 
Bulgarian judiciary towards greater efficiency and checks on the actions of the executive has come 
since 2007 from the cooperation and verification mechanism of the EU, which was imposed on 
Bulgaria and Romania as a condition for membership.26 At the EU level, a process has started towards 
introducing a regulation conditioning EU funds on the presence of rule of law in the member 
country.27 It remains to be seen whether and to what extent changes in the Bulgarian judicial system 
towards an increased capacity of the system to hinder the effectiveness of predatory entrepreneurs 
will happen. 
The observations covering the third post-1989 decade for Bulgaria allow for a short summary 
of its development model for the decade. In a sense it seems a hybrid one. The leading engines of the 
previous decade – low cost and activation of factors of production – continue to be important 
elements in the mix. It seems, though, that these engines are weakening and cannot be sustained for 
                                                            




27 See for example http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2019-0349_EN.html and 
the links therein. 
the future. For many observers the old growth model of the beginning of the 21st century is 
exhausted and needs to be replaced.28 
However, other engines also seem to have been emerging during the last decade, following a 
more intensive mode of development. These include integration in the global economy, utilization of 
more qualified labor, and adoption of technologies closer to the global technological edge. This 
means less reliance on low cost, and more strategic orientation towards active participation in higher 
value-added complex global production chains. Such a model of development does indeed hold the 
promise that Bulgaria may break out of the endless cycles of catching up to a point and then falling 
behind, and may converge towards the rich West in a more sustained manner. However, the 
question remains whether the conditions necessary for such a development are, or at least will be, in 
place. 
The 2019 outlook for Bulgaria’s economy: pessimism vs. optimism 
As is often the case, the analysis of the Bulgarian economy up to this point does not enable a 
definite answer about the prospects for the future. Everything said so far may support both a 
pessimistic and an optimistic outlook for the coming decades. The analysis does enable, however, a 
clear and simple definition of pessimism and optimism in this case, as well as an informed 
argumentation of both the case for pessimism and the case for optimism. 
The definition of pessimism in the analytical framework presented here is the expectation that 
in the foreseeable future Bulgaria will not be able to overcome its century-and-a-half-old cyclical 
inability to converge to the rich West in terms of standard of living. The definition of optimism is that, 
on the contrary, Bulgaria is ready to break through its historical ceiling of convergence and to achieve 
                                                            
28 The prime example of this thinking is Deputy Prime Minister Donchev’s widely read and discussed 
blog post about the necessity of economic transformation (Donchev 2019). 
within the following few decades an historically unprecedented level of catching up in its standard of 
living. What remains is to outline the arguments for pessimism and for optimism which the details of 
the analysis presented so far provide. 
The outlook for Bulgaria as of 2019: the case for pessimism 
The crucial ingredient for getting close to the world’s highest achievable standard of living is 
(broadly understood) capital accumulation. Bulgaria is nowhere near meeting the necessary 
conditions for such a process. It has too many “withouts”. It is still without sufficiently high levels of 
domestic saving. It is currently without any notable success in attracting foreign savings as a source 
of capital formation. It is without major institutions of capitalism such as an efficient capital market, 
reliable contract enforcement, or a predictable bankruptcy framework. In the most recent decade it 
has been without capacity to make important structural reforms. It is without a rule of law. But it 
does have a vibrant predatory entrepreneurial environment, a ruling elite which cannot be punished, 
and an ensuing establishment of state capture and high corruption. All this means that, inevitably, 
Bulgaria will lag behind the rich West, even though most likely it will be able to not allow itself to fall 
too far behind. All the conditions needed to ensure that Bulgaria’s cycles of not-quite-convergence 
will continue are in place and functioning. 
The outlook for Bulgaria as of 2019: the case for optimism 
What Bulgaria has experienced since the beginning of the 21st century is unprecedented and 
renders all its previous experiences less relevant. It has experienced the most sustained catching up 
in a century and a half. It is going through an unprecedented two-decade regime of sound money 
and fiscal discipline.  The degree of presence of Western capital and degree of integration in the 
global economy, especially one of its richest regions, as the EU is, is also unprecedented. The country 
is subjected to much more intricately institutionalized foreign conditionality than in any previous 
historical period, and the prospects are that this disciplining and development-aiding conditionality 
will deepen. The last two decades have seen a definite strengthening of productive 
entrepreneurship. Both public and private debt levels are low and clearly manageable. The economy 
has demonstrated clear and convincing signs of sustained resilience related to overcoming both the 
Great Recession and KTB failure. Reforms aimed at overcoming important deficiencies such as those 
related to the rule of law and human capital will eventually happen due to domestic and external 
pressures. All this means that conditions in the Bulgarian economy are qualitatively different from 
any previous moment in its history. There is a slow, but positive and self-feeding catching up dynamic 
which will inevitably lead to unprecedented levels of convergence of the standard of living in Bulgaria 
in the next few decades. 
Conclusion 
For a century and a half Bulgaria has neither really converged, nor really fallen behind the rich 
Western countries in terms of standard of living. Its inability to effectively converge has exhibited a 
certain cyclicality with episodes of catching up and episodes of falling behind. The most recent three 
decades following the systemic changes in 1989 have not been an exception. 
These three decades have seen an initial period of serious decline, followed by two distinct 
periods of catching up – one defined by Bulgaria’s efforts to accede to the EU, and one defined by its 
experience as an EU member state while also dealing with the consequences of the global Great 
Recession. These three decades exhibit relatively distinct models of economic development. The first 
model was completely state dominated with loose fiscal and monetary policies, lack of market 
institutionalization, and very favorable conditions for predatory entrepreneurship. The second model 
was dominated by the EU accession effort and involved privatization, market institutionalization, a 
regime of sound money, and disciplined fiscal policies. The model relied on low costs of production 
and low taxes and provided a relatively improved environment for productive entrepreneurship. The 
third model, which is still unfolding, involves some of the extensive features of the previous one (low-
cost competitiveness and activation of non-employed factors of production), but also exhibits 
features of intensification of development towards higher-cost, higher value-added activities with 
integration in global production chains. 
The analysis is not decisive on the question of whether it may be expected that Bulgaria will 
manage to break the cycle of relatively unsuccessful convergence attempts and close the gap to the 
richest Western countries more substantially, or whether the conditions ensuring that its efforts to 
catch up will continue to remind us of Sisyphus are still very much in place. Both the pessimistic and 
the optimistic expectations can at this point be supported by a serious set of arguments and which 
scenario will come to pass cannot at present be known. 
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